Number-Go-Up-Technology

Incentive Structure and Allocative Heuristic

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Contents

I – Fixed Stars Cross Mad Suns 1

II – Positing of Signs 3

III – Formative Settlement in Deficit 6

IV – Smart Stupid Games 9

V – De-deparadoxification of Conflict 13

I – Fixed Stars Cross Mad Suns

The number disposes the focus. Because of its digitization (and digitalization) it is, in this respect, a definitive sign. A called number is the called number identical to itself, and this is neither approximately nor perspectivally relative. It settles according to its self-determining convergence. For example, in the case of a philosophical term such as "reason", a scholarly trained interpretation presupposes such an educational effort that those who have no interest in philosophy remain unaware of precisely this circumstance. The term remains word, remains a contingency formula, and everyone who sees more in it mad, or rather: *unreasonable*. Ignorance projects itself without further hindrance into its own observations and enables a complexity-reduced orientation for itself via the deselection of other possible notions. The context- and observer-relative attribution of complex and qualified as "knowledge" notions fragments possible consensus to such an extent that communicating about its signs must be far more complex. The condition of the number as a sign is thus particularly suited as a cognitive parameter and consensus-enabling, or consensual, domain, because a variety of potential interpretations are eliminated. The sign number is grounded in its indicative positivity. Accordingly, focal points can be found more easily regarding and via the concreteness of a number.[1] The restricted options of interpreting the sign number foster orientation, because consensus can form more seamlessly given such structural presuppositions.

The linguistic practicality further reinforces such ways. In almost every milieu numbering is applied: on menus, as article numbers, when searching for a parking space, and so forth. The referability of relative numbering is quasi-absolute within social interactions and thus allows for the (arbitrarily posed) elimination of arbitrariness.

Just like this instrumental use of digits, respectively numbers, fosters social bindingness, it also opens up its potential of abuse. This is the case because there is a certain exactness suggested to the observer, with his own past experiences, which is emerging out of the context which the number is embedded in.
This remark of a little phenomenology of the sign number shall, such is the common

1 Perceived as socially binding, times with "round" numbers are better suited for dispersed groups to gather at the same place again. In many cultures, a multiple of 10 establishes psychological security and perceived barriers better than odd numbers. Compare with this the concept of the focal point: Schelling, Thomas Crombie. The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge: Harvard, 1960, p. 57

phenomenological approach, point out the primacy and its respective deciding effects.
The indicative positivity of the number can be applied instrumentally in such a way that it enhances a misguiding sense of psychological security. The exactness of the number may calm down. One is familiar with it. One even knows it. Did you know that? Do you know the current numbers regarding the current turmoils, meaning: Are you informed? Then you may calm down now, or you may *not* and shall forever hope to be informed by the upcoming number. The potential for misleading reduction of complexity toward a trusting audience is permanently abused and the irritated observer is posed into the gaze into them. Such a form of constantly fluctuating cybernetic arrangements of orientation thus leads to the conclusive disorientation of the observers across time.
Even when it is announced otherwise: the number by itself knows – who would have known – nothing. Yet, it can be posed within a variety of many more contexts. As deceitful security it certainly can also facilitate agitations. And yet it remains nothing but a number (on the screen), but within this condition a reality with factual consequences. The reflection upon its suggestive power is not implied in its mere concretion. With other words, *that* the concretion is based upon a process, a methodology, which renders it, is not carried on by the number. Its posed-ness within the number's respective context may be exceedingly difficult to decipher. It should now be evident that, although speaking of numbers, the topic at hand is not primarily arithmetic or mathematics in general. Of interest is the semiotic use of the number, the communicative ordering upon digitization and its social implications in a particular sense. Our thesis is that the instrumental display of the number establishes a prevalence of vectors and thus suggests a state of perpetual progress – a state that also requires a certain effort for its sustainment; and all that, although idleness is the norm. In other words: this is about how numbers are mentioned non-informative information without mention; this is about that in spite of their illuminating correctness they, as the case may be, merely suggest truth in order to cause confusion.
Some milieus along with their business models might have, through their self-description as transparent concretion in spite of their obscurely opaque nature of their actual mechanisms, isolated themselves as self-carrying structures. Quite easily, philosophers can make this claim regarding banks and vice versa. Both treat their own performativity as domains sufficiently rendered plausible by their respective groundwork. Let us firstly remain with the philosophers who speak about technology: the auto-logical opacification of technological operations is, according to Heidegger, the

only way in which technology can appear: “The enframing concealment conceals even its very concealing [...]”[i] And now, so it seems to us, that a certain opacity-fabricating effect of technology is ceaselessly prompted by its structural conditions. The (transparent) concretion indicates itself through the technical display in the form of signs, which presupposes a certain semiotic calculus for its readability. And, in turn, this very play of indicating and indicated signs along their interpretations autonomizes itself continuously (in a technological way). One experiences the mythical symbolic potency of the concrete signs: the alchemy of reason. Such resembles the way in which one receives a good gift: with the afterwards developing understanding that one has always wanted it – and especially then, if the prior ego of the recipient must have disappeared in his rationalizing plausibilization. Sadly, some lose themselves if they from then on unremittingly want more of the same gifts that, prior to that, they never wanted. It sets in a sort of heuristic correction via (technological) media, which conceals prior heuristics and which from then on adjusts attention and praise in its newly (re)discovered sense.

II – Positing of Signs

The data generated by the difference realia can be read according to their respective interpretative potentials. In such a way arranged information yields metrics that refer to the constantly growing data sets and thus are transformed across time. The value of such a metric would disclose a sign in the aforementioned semiotic sense, since it has no fixed reference. Thus, it is an index of the respectively filtered data. A symbol can become the metric if its sign creates meaning which is only concretized by said sign. That means that the sign is subject to a self-altering effect once it is referred to. Showcased is this phenomenon of a failing heuristic in the case of incompetent interventions which are described by Goodhart’s law. The indicative function of the sign and the thereby attested metrics are not understood; instead, the symbolic power is mistaken for the reference. The crucial error lies in assuming that the manipulation of the secondarily effective symbols, one falsely expects, would lead to a desired change of originally not referred-to matters. One then ails to experience that it does not work (anymore). The semiotic complex was not comprehended and a basic epistemological blunder was made. The symbols are a product of second-order, one realizes. And the

afterthought upholds the lack of forethought.

What this leads us to assume is that every metric constitutes a symbolically potent sign which conducts a vector of sense within an incentive structure. For example, the number that goes up, if it successfully conveys that more is *sensibly* more. That may be likes below the selfie, net income, pounds on the flat bench or cumulative infections – given a respective communication, the number invariably functions as a symbolically displayed vector of a sense-making indication. Being liked more feels better. More money at the end of the month makes more at the beginning of the next month. Do you even lift, bro? The science says: Power (belongs to) what I declare. In such symbolisms a worth-likeness is expressed and the technological genesis of the metric is rendered more and more concealed.

Especially if said metric can remain unexplained and not understood, it is furthermore applicable for (normative) control. The above-mentioned examples do not just bring up their explicitly mentioned values with respect of indicating a status – which might or might not be informatively redundant – but also in regard of them enframing the rising number as progression toward set objectives. Exceeding technologically indicating functions, the *social orientation* is crucial. Since the complex of the metric opens up a horizon of values within its respective context (without showing it), the observers can be implemented into the self-carriage of the sign as a symbol. This circumstance of a symbolic progression, respectively progressive symbolism, reaches act-inducingly outside of the metric into the observation in order to direct it as servant. Assuming such a constellation of sense, because the progression fosters the observer he then frames himself into the structure that he framed. He uses himself as the lever for the machinery that levers him.

One can view Goodhart's law as a description of regulatory consequences caused by the incompetence of reading the signs of the signs. In similar fashion one finds the dilemma of confidence without insight into the automization of just thusly appearing signs within Heidegger's phenomenology: "This posing is the most dangerous of the danger. According to this posing of the danger through the framing of the enframing it appears still and always as if the technology was a means in the hand of man. But true is that now the doing of man is posed insofar he gives his hand for the up-bringing of technology."[ii] To not comprehend the symbolic nature and not being able to read the signs – this can be a simple metric – means in principle as well that the primacy in this relation cannot be identified. So gazes today's man onto the numbers while he does not

discern that the metric which assesses them and which was set to serve him enframes him within an incentive structure that enables the gazing altogether; and above all, such infamy is now defended by himself in his belief that this is his very personal fate.[2] All too often to such an extent that he turns this (re)discovered fatalistic determination into his final heuristic. Going further down this path, he then oftentimes degrades to a dyslexic of sense in a world full of signs.

Even granted an absolute media competence, the actual confrontation with the medium and the thereby generated relatability in second order persists. One simply cannot choose the choice. The observer is already observed into his channels before he can create the presuppositions to select the ones he prefers. The structural conditions he never escapes.

How does a form condition of the metric, that indicates its observable signs and symbols, need to be arranged in order to not further abuse the enframing of the observer into his channels up until his utter deformation? Such a structural condition that technologically respectively mechanically[3] works as incentive structure, has to be voluntarily chosen and must yet be dispositive. Even a form condition of such kind would be a structural condition claiming prevalence within its area of effect. The user, who uses it, who levers it to lever himself must forebode the saver from the longer end of the lever. And then must glimpse that it is he who shines.

2 Compare with this von Foerster‘s remarks on the cybernetics of conditioning in: von Foerster, Heinz. „Was ist Gedächtnis, daß es Rückschau und Vorschau ermöglicht?“ In Gedächtnis: Probleme und Perspektiven der interdisziplinären Gedächtnisforschung. herausgegeben von Siegfried J. Schmidt, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1991

3 Compare with this μηχαν, which is not restricted to the mechanical apparatus, but rather refers to bringing about an effect through skillful application. Though, in modern contexts, the term technology usually refers to the complex of mechanisms which render something available, it is not limited to machines here. “I designate as technique a *traditional*, *efficacious* action (and you see that this does not differ from the magic, religious, symbolic action). It is necessary that it be *traditional* and *efficacious*.” (Mauss, Marcel. „Die Techniken des Körpers“ In Soziologie und Anthropologie Band 2. published by Klaus Lichtblau, Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 2010, p. 205, translated by the author)

III – Formative Settlement in Deficit

For the mobile-making of a collective mass the deficit is generally well fit – or conversely, the abolition thereof. Fundamental in this respect is the concretion of the thing which by its deficit forms vectors. In this manner the guiding principle emerges that the deficiency of the thing, not owning the thing, is actually the crucial case. Only in this way, a *longing for* said thing can develop, which further attempts to retrieve it. "The longing, effort and sacrifice that separate us from objects are also supposed to lead us towards them. Withdrawal and approach are in practice complementary notions, each of which presupposes the other; they are two sides of our relationship to objects, which we call subjectively our desire and objectively their value. We have to make the object enjoyed more remote from us in order to desire it again, and in relation to the distant object this desire is the first stage of approaching it, the first ideal relation to it."[iii] Here, Simmel describes how the explicit negation introduces the condition of a longing striving. It is the *not something* that introduces want, rather than *something*. This seems to be preceded by a certain cognitive condition, namely the experiencing of respectively the imagining of something and its disappearance. The residual traces of remembrance strongly hint what the one who remembers will express through his desire: at least, he wants to possess the contents of his memory and, sometimes even, be them.[4]

Since he is not alone with this condition and the vectors of his longing interweave into a net with others who remember, the ones posed in such relations begin relating with each other. If the striving initiates interchanging trade settlements in which they mutually participate, they form economical social relations based on their self-interest. According to Simmel, this infrastructural condition with its operativity is then the primacy preceding its traded contents, respectively values. Simmel writes: "The desire and sentiment of the subject is the driving force in the background, but it could not by itself bring about the value-form, which is the result of balancing objects against each other. The economy transmits all valuations through the form of exchange, creating an intermediate realm between the desires that are the source of all human activity and the

4 Freudian psychoanalysis introduces in a similar (economistic) logic the concepts of object-cathexis and identification. In a rereading of Freudian psychoanalysis, Sloterdijk emphasizes the elements of *thymós* and its effects. He accentuates their origin in the individual's claim to recognition and its drive to inscribe himself into reality. According to Sloterdijk, psychoanalysis overestimates the *Eros* at the expense of *thymós* in its power to motivate action. The latter term does not appear in Freud in this form. The categorical correction by Sloterdijk seems as significant as it is surprising in its approachability since it only became popular about a century later. (Compare with this: Sloterdijk, Peter. Zorn und Zeit. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2008)

satisfaction of needs in which they culminate. The specific characteristic of the economy as a particular form of behaviour and communication consists not only in exchanging values but in the exchange of values."[iv] The traders hypostatize their relative relations via the actual settlement of the exchange as absolute. Simmel emphasizes the prioritization of the trade preceding the value. It is the trade which objectifies the values – here, understood as an assessment of things – namely, via the actual practice of the trade. The *value* of values is not inherent and remains variable. Things are actually traded. The *value* is not transformed within first order, even though common use of language suggests otherwise. A financial speculator may have established the necessary counterintuitive approach toward this. The order book registers the *bids* and *asks* of the respective traders and only if they match, a trade is settled, whose actually fulfilled rate could be utterly disconnected from its *value*, a merely ideal measure. The market price is set by the rate relative to the national currency in the respective trade pair at the point in time of the settled trade. There is no grounded trace of a *value* in this process. The *value* can only persist within the intersection of the projections of the traders as an idea, as a shared fiction, and develop a mercantilistic heuristic, but does not have to. Financial, history-less nihilism is possible.

When we examine a trading pair of any given asset against a national currency, and the latter is increased in its supply, then a correction of the *asks* relative to the supply-increase is a stable, usually called inflation-adjusted, pricing. And even though any thing against a national currency could be priced instantly according to its extension, this self-regulative process takes a certain amount of time and usually develops a difficult to predict dynamic on its own. It even seems to be the case that a fundamental function of price is that nobody knows *the right price*. Price is emergent through trade.

The pricing-in of prices, that is also bumped by monetary creation, has such strong recursive force that a substantial part of the finance sector focuses on such second-order effects. One can ask, contemplating a bit far-reaching, if in accordance with system-theoretical groundwork money, because of its immense autonomous dynamic, has developed an autopoietic subsystem of the economy. And further: If the primary function of money has differentiated itself from a "generally accepted preference"[v] to an incentive structure within the respective systems. This is the case since the function as store of value is performed reliably by large indices that are fairly stable if inflation-adjusted. Meanwhile, due to the supply-increase of the national currencies emergent differences and thusly caused tensions induce an everlasting hunt for more money in

absolute terms to not lose in relative terms. This has grown into an immense drive structure within our everyday manners and greatly exceeds the issue of money. The increasing *frictionlessness* (of public) market structures points in the same direction.

Even examples from ancient Greece attest the interdependence of money and a gaping difference relative to its purpose: the future induction of practiced trade through concrete incentivization via deficiency. Thus, the deficiency is there before positive states set in. Rather, they can only emerge because they are posed in and at the incentive structure. Michael Hutter writes: "With the money supply thus created, the building programme of the Acropolis was paid for. It was therefore not the volume of trade in familiar goods that had necessitated the creation of an appropriate means of payment. Rather, a means of payment could be set in circulation by finding a suitable external reference—the building programme. Subsequently, these means of payment, once they were in circulation, were also available for paying for everyday goods."[vi] The monetary deficit is thus also a purpose-generating vector.[5] The function as a means of payment is secondary. In unison with the exhaustion of the disposed purpose, the incentive structure dissipates into the intersections within a vectorial network, which can re-interpret its dispatched goods. The incentive structure is not sufficiently explained if one illustrates it as an array of the sum of (moving) targets. If so, it would abolish itself quasi-teleologically. It is more so the case that incentive is effective as the self-correcting mechanism of moving targets relative to who aims at them. According to the continuous differential suspense when approximating distancing targets, the incentive structure tenses while documenting itself as a continuous prospection of prospections. And thus: conceals, *enframes*, itself in the realizations of its tendencies. Relatively, the entire world is happening, yet absolutely happens *nothing* but the re-distribution of that which was dispositional potential. Exactly these very differences that are hereby created are the distinctive distinctions: a delta-reality. What was gained is a cybernetic allocative heuristic of its users as a concomitant secondary effect, which seems to be its primary reason.

5 Not unfrequently, sudden wealth leads the utter corruption of motivation and the dissolution of a vectorial placement of the subject. (Compare with this remarks on the corruption effect in Ziemann, Andreas. *Über Belohnung: Eine soziologische Betrachtung*. Weinheim: Beltz Juventa, 2025, p. 51)

IV – Smart Stupid Games

Beginning with the theoretical design means that proximally and for the most part a need for the need remains. Why would, in a sense, the draft de-draft itself into reality where, and I repeat myself, the unremitting and constant suspense of a desired actualization into prospection *really* is practiced? The question must be how one has to pose the incentive structure so that the users, according to their predispositions, reach it, and are being reached, even though the users must remain differentiated from it in order to persist. That, if everything was different, *the world* – only if and then – would be better by the same token presupposes it had to be a different world for it to be potent of this very hypothetical; but it is not, and if so, only through incremental change. Only distributed across time the world discloses new horizons. The echo of normative appeals, which discuss how everything should be, gets lost in the void space of the monad machine and the great ideas remain (un)realized as great ideas, because they never accustomed themselves to the banality of the structures they are in. What the complexity reductions, the cognition of the consensual domain, and the endlessly scaling networks share as their fundamental logic is that they are able to identify a mostly redundified smallest common denominator and thus capture comprehensive observers. The binding relations emerge from the sense of actually practiced, because *repeatedly* displayed contingency.[6] The rationalizations of why things behave in the way they do must remain as exactly such: rationalizations. Attributions post facto which integrate themselves affirmingly into their respective systems dissolve potential conflicts via their indifferentiation. In cybernetic terms, complexity reducing transduced output equates to system stabilizing input.[7] Analogous to evolutionary (de-)selectivity, the state of affairs probabilistically wagers on that which generates

6 No formal logician ever spoke as precisely and cogently as Kierkegaard, who barely spoke German, German: My landlord, the chemist, *er hatte sich verändert*, in the pregnant sense in which the Germans understand these words, and as far as I know, 'to change' is used in a similar way in some quarters of Copenhagen — i.e. he had married. I wanted to congratulate him, but because my command of the German language is limited to the extent that I do not know the precise expressions one would use in specific circumstances, and in particular in these circumstances, I restricted myself to a sort of pantomime gesture. I placed my hand over my heart and looked at him with an expression of tender appreciation. He shook my hand. After this exchange, he proceeded to produce a proof of the aesthetic validity of marriage.* And he succeeded, precisely as well as he had succeeded the last time in proving the perfection of bachelorhood. When I speak German, I am the most accommodating man in the world. (Kierkegaard, Sören. *Repetition*. Translated by Walter Lowrie. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1941, p. 22)

7 An example is self-affirming "normal-narcissism" of ego-defence which re-interprets resistance as envy and feeds on it in a self-reinforcing manner. A functionalistic perspective requires no pathology whatsoever in this instance.

positive expected values: the unlikelihood of the complicated loses against the likelihood of the banal across time. In his *Logic of Stupidity*, Bazon Brock illustrates very elaborately why entities preserve themselves *despite* their "stupidity", well, especially *because of* their "stupidity". Stupidity is a self-selecting structural condition. Complexity, this implies: in its connectability disabled relatability does not profit from lindy-effects as its opposite does. Since, across time, the *friction* of complexity fragments itself and its efficacy becomes limited to vulgarized forms. In contrast to this, minima of required cognitive capacities and thereby the un-identifiability of otherwise apparent differences, namely the structural condition "stupidity", have no issues fabricating their self-affirming rationalizations. For, as Brock writes: "The problem [as well as the capability] lies in the fact that **the mechanisms of our creaturely stupidity suggest this logic**; it is successful because the advocates of this logic can uphold a naive conviction of themselves as the ones who argue logically."[vii] From a sociocybernetic perspective, stupidity is a deselector of potentials for dissent. This can also be identified when comprehending that the successful, across time distributed, incentive structures develop focal points which are orientating and uniting because of their concrete simplicity.

The increasing sign number can appear symbolically potent and normative insofar as it works as a valueless value and merely indicatingly displays the figure of the respective metric. What the observers, the *community*, who would otherwise have nothing to share with each other, unites, is the vectorial meshwork of their self-interests and the thus productive-becoming banality of the circumstance that the number *shall* increase (dispositively). A useful rendering of such potentials via technics is Number-Go-Up-Technology.

The term Number-Go-Up-Technology has been established as an (ironic) depiction of Bitcoin. This is also intended to address, as mentioned above, the dysfunctional shifts of purpose of the metric as described by Goodhart's law. One could discuss at length what the technological-historical importance of Bitcoin is, but particularly its self-carrying assembly constructed by meshing incentive structures that has let its *public ledger* emerge as a reference point seems spectacular. Especially system theorists might at least be excited about this construct of self-referential avoidance of redundancy. The actualization of a (distribution-)game, whose (non-explicit) rules motivated new players to enter, was achieved.[8]

8 The self-regulative competition among *miners* installs, with respect to the present size of the network,

Then, what warrants that the users gather as actual desirers within the incentive structure? We recall: They must, among other things, remember that which has disappeared. In this way, they can transmute into (memorable) shape inside the webwork of their trade relations. If one grants these social interactions a rigid form condition, a scheme of horizons, one can declare this common play: a circumstance in which users do not primarily exchange *values*, but *exchange* values. The objectified relations establish points of reference of subsequently possible game actions. (And said is far more likely to happen in a stupid than a smart manner.) These game actions are contingent and, if one assumes players to be conscious actors, also voluntary and desired by common players. The rigidity of the form condition *does not* transpire from the game into the players. The degrees of freedom of the game are warranted by its invariance of its possibilities. If one assumes a "total" *en-framing*, the play would be impossible, because respective subgames were already permeated by structural determination. So, the players are not proximally and for the most part posed into the game. It is a qualitative characteristic that they are, if they are. But what brings it about that this could be the case? Or, to put it differently: From where should the coming-from come from?

Assuming a user was preconditionally posed into the incentive structure, even without his awareness, then this even presupposes that he "is" *there*. But why would that be? What warrants the formation of the incentive structure into an intersection of systems and what can it then offer to the user so that he is enticed to reciprocate? How could the "new" (distribution-)game stand in harmony with games already being played? Ascribing utter contingency of action to the users in conjunction with a preceding, intended consensus seems unlikely, if not impossible. To bet on the sudden transformation of mere vectorial agents into organized players seems to be an obvious losing play. Such would not be a long-term winning strategy. Yet, it remains a question, how the play could come into play as worthy of playing. At least, one hint from a system-theoretical point of view by Dirk Baecker could help us, namely "that the play is no action, but a frame for action."[viii]

Delegating one's own actions to the frame for action's form condition tallies with the scattered arrangement of motives which the singular actions have served anyway. Participating in the game is thus performatively consensual and the intentions that

an arbitrage business into the securing of the network. The profitability of the particular individual interests is posed into the collective effort of the network's operativity.

guided players toward it fade into oblivion. Games may therefore be regarded as just insofar as their rules and standards are rigid – this also implies delivering game results with a sometimes devastating lack of care, as a consequence of its form condition, to the player. He may react with affirmation, rejection or even indifference: However, based on these reactions, he in no scenario can escape the consequences of the game. A rigid game can expand to a greater frame for action if, and only if, its form conditions generate its own axioms of reality. Incidentally, the rigid rules and standards remain untouched. Bateson writes regarding play: “Notice that *play*, as a label, does not limit or define the acts that make up play. *Play* is applicable only to certain broad premises of the interchange. In ordinary parlance, "play" is not the name of an act or action; it is the name of a *frame* for action. We may expect, then, that play is not subject to the regular rules of reinforcement. Indeed, anybody who has tried to stop some children playing knows how it feels when his efforts simply get included in the shape of the game.”[ix]

The players tie themselves inside of the frame for action and, accordingly fetch (overbearingly) the available into the boundaries of the game. So it is then, that playing is the active-spontaneous acting of what is possible within the confinement. To interrupt the game would be futile; qua nature of the players, interrupting would be rendered the move “interruption”. The attempt to interrupt would, moreover, be contrary to the dynamic which is explicitly praised and only misconceived because it constitutes a second-order effect. If, nevertheless, one wagers on the self-reinforcement of the game, then one endorses the incorporation of capable players within this very domain of play, which they withal prefer to such an extent that they are willing to remodel their playgrounds in accordance with it. When we design the infrastructure to the benefit of allocative heuristics, then one thing prevail: we must be able to ascribe the winners of the game their winning moves within the game. Their achievement of grand *values* must indeed find appreciation through mechanisms that ensure the game banks on the success proofs of its winners. This can be displayed by incorporating the provenance of the game into the game. A distributive structure, that nullifies its greatest givers like anybody else via the quota, misses the opportunity to utilize the assets of its best players for its own benefit. That is why one, when operating a value-distributing subsystem, must account for the accountability of its winners and givers.

V – The De-deparadoxification of Conflicts

Now, what does the (up-going) number signalize in the game of the difference realia and why should it be *ought to* go up? At the least, it indicates that giver and winner have performed, via the technological form conditions of the difference realia and in accordance with its users, a distribution of values by the amounted difference of the uptick. Thereby, the giver / winner of the respective move has logged himself in the provenance of the difference realia and thus expanded the set of interpretable data, which further remain digitally permanent as information and ready for future allocative heuristic. Derived from the differences of *wherefrom* to *whereto* and the distinctability of the status *prior to* and *after* the gift an indicative metric with the sign number is displayed that, providing orientation, knows only one direction: up. Number-Go-Up-Technology.

Questionable remains, if the self-referential documentation can be transduced as referable data by the system connected to it downstream. Then also, if the differences realized via the difference realia can lead to deparadoxification, to sublation of conflict within other systems.

Since we intend to ground a dispositive approach, the conceptual questions are: Can the connectability of the deparadoxification of conflicts *be posed into the game*? Can the function, which leads to a (partial) resolution of the conflict, be lettered and worded within the game? So, can the formalization preventively hypostate the ideal which is negotiated in the conflict? Can the ideal be "painted into the horizon" and thus be preserved from its dilutive actualization? The game would serve as the respective venue of events, or rather as *null point-object*[9], of said bustle. Just as Nietzsche's asceticism, while philosophizing, emergently philosophizes the emergency case, the reality can never become crasser than the (tragic) imagination of it. One might now ask, where the very battleground of our not-better world lies. In formality? Is the player "saved" from becoming a "reactive talent" when one reaches him into the game? Since: "The active, attacking, encroaching man is still a hundred steps closer to justice than the reactive man; for he has no need whatever to appraise his object falsely and with prejudice, as the reactive man does, and must. That is why, in fact, the aggressive man, as the stronger, braver, nobler one, has at all times also had the *freer* eye, the *better* conscience on his side [...]"[x]

9 Compare with this the Objekt-term by Günther and Kaehr.

Can a conflict, a potential and/or ideational war, by means of active agonistic rituals of overbearing practice, dissolve real tension formally – or better framed: be sealed by it? Perhaps the fight itself is the stimulant for those who imagine it and do not hand over their capacity for imagination, their bodies, to it. In this manner, one would elude the common double negating everpresent incentivization by the inscription and would reach positive, active talent. One would overbear the presets that render him a mere endurer.
But *who* participates? Who *wants* to play? *Who* is overarchingly *stupid* enough to *want* the number to go up?
After all, opposing the player is less than the disappearance of nothing.

i Heidegger, Martin. „Die Kehre“ In *Identität und Differenz*. Gesamtausgabe Band 11. published by Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2000, p. 122, translated by the author

ii Ibidem p. 115

iii Simmel, Georg. *The Philosophy of Money*. Translated by Tom Bottomore and David Frisby. London: Routledge, 2004, p. 73

iv Ibidem p. 80

v Luhmann, Niklas. 2019b: 275 quoted in Ziemann, Andreas. *Über Belohnung: Eine soziologische Betrachtung. Weinheim*: Beltz Juventa, 2025, p. 9, translated by the author

vi Hutter, Michael. „Die frühe Form der Münze“ *In Probleme der Form*. published by Dirk Baecker, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, p. 174, translated by the author

vii Brock, Bazon. *Ästhetik gegen erzwungene Unmittelbarkeit: Schriften 1978-1986*. Köln: DuMont, 1986, p. 302, translated by the author

viii Baecker, Dirk. „Das Spiel mit der Form“ In *Probleme der Form*. published by Dirk Baecker, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, p. 156, translated by the author

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