

Mnemotechnics II

Memory and Realia

v1.0

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Translated by the author

Gerald Hock

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I – Positing Possibilities of Differentiation

In small communities as well as in large civilizations, people have created cultural objects by incorporating them into their self-description. Such objects, *realia*, inherit their significance through the practice of their presentation, which thus constitutes the *presupposition* of their very presentation. They recursively generate their structures and bond different times together. The *realia* are, in a certain sense, positings that condition the collectives referring to them. What once was an arbitrary beginning becomes a voluntary initiation.

The question regarding the origin of such a complex social entity as culture seems difficult to answer and is not exhausted merely by the revelation of its *realia*. Having said that, it also requires a marking of the very threshold of origin if one attempts an identification of said origin. This opens up questions concerning the conditions of the origin *and* of its documentation. Would a culture be identical with itself, if the (communicated) origin was another one? May the threshold of the beginning possibly be determined only retrospectively by a positing that is actualized through a *realia*? That alludes to the question, to what extent the concreteness of a *realia* is determinative for a collective that refers to it?¹ All these questions lead to an investigation of the concrete designation of a *realia* such that it can be distinguished precisely as such—a *realia*.

Our concern is therefore, first, how the form of a *realia* is determined and, consequently, second, how it thus renders the form of the collective determinable. One might frivolously remark that a *realia* is context-dependent—or more strongly, a context-determined—*thing*. But which is not such?

Following the calculus of forms, we speak of a *realia* as a thing that by virtue of its determinacy allows for distinctions from other things by virtue of its determinacy. Furthermore, respective to how the *realia* is distinguished, it devotes concreteness to the collective referring to it, because said collective now may establish distinctions to other ones and in this way gain an identity. The thing's concreteness allows to render differences to other things concrete.

1 Compare with this: “Likewise, just as an individual can develop and sustain a personal identity across the succession of days and years only by virtue of memory, a group can reproduce its collective identity only through memory. The difference is that collective memory has no neuronal substrate. In its place stands culture: a complex of identity-securing knowledge objectified in symbolic forms such as myths, songs, dances, proverbs, laws, sacred texts, images, ornaments, markings, pathways, and—even in the case of the Australian Aboriginal peoples—entire landscapes.” (Assmann, Jan. *Das kulturelle Gedächtnis: Schrift, Erinnerung und politische Identität in frühen Hochkulturen*. München: Verlag C.H.Beck, 2018, p. 89)

Such formal-logical investigations are particularly relevant when the particular *thing is* formal-logical. That is, when the realia is characterized by—different to other things—establishing *distinctions formally*. As distinguished from things of everyday use—unlike positively determinable “Zeug”²—such a realia does not appear as and through that which enables interaction with it but the realia *is* that which it casts formalized as difference.

Typically, realia are occupied by symbolism and/or *charged* with provenance. The Christian crucifix refers to the crucifixion of Christ. Relics are in part random and arbitrary things—pieces of wood like any other—but with a definitive history, and they are relics only due to their provenance. Although, how well this provenance can be verified is another concern.³ Such realia are what they are including their history, or at least including what is assumed to be their history. That is why, they are always subject to an epistemic problem. A historical object may be entirely uninteresting with respect to what it is. Solely through its provenance and its previous owners does it acquire social importance. Was the chandelier once owned by an emperor? Did the painting hang in the Vatican? Do the minerals originate from another planet? Such objects, and the economic trade they are subject to, are by no means determined by use value, material costs, or similar “fundamental” markers. If Beckenbauer scored a championship goal with a certain ball, it will trade differently than if merely the neighbor baker Bauer, practices juggling with it on the weekends. Historical events adhere, at least by association, to the object and influence its market price. And this is the case even though a definitive verification of authenticity is commonly not available. An illuminating example that captures this complex is found in the circumstance when a painting is one day regarded as the greatest Campendonk of all time and the next day turns out to merely be some random Beltracchi. This example demonstrates that the painting exists within entirely different contexts from one moment to the next, although materially nothing about it was altered. Only the attribution of the painter changes, and with it the associations attached to his or her name—and subsequently various disputes within the world of the experts, juridical complications within the legal system, and so forth. The painting by itself remains identical with itself. Evidently, one can readily recognize in that case that the market price of such an illiquid painting is negotiated in second order and according to its social attributions. Any assumption of an “inherent

2 Compare with this Heidegger’s remarks on “Zeug”. (Heidegger, Martin. *Sein und Zeit*. Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 2006, p. 66)

3 Compare with this: Hock, Gerald. *Epistemic Order*.

value” or the like is fatally misleading. In second order the painting is referred to differently, yet to declare it thereby to be another painting appears completely contradictory. The disclosed provenance, rather the disclosed-ness of provenance is crucial. Only due to appropriate procedures for determining the factually accurate provenance *can* said provenance become relevant in the first place. It must not only be represented in the object but the observer must also be able to perceive it and, by means of presupposed procedures, be capable of doing so. Just a brief remark: a self-verifying, its own genesis including *public*—that is, unrestrictedly inspectable—*ledger* could, if applicable, prove suitable in various specific cases. Since, for the observer the perceivability is decisive in regard to the determination of the thing.

The circumstance of a formal-logical notation leads directly to *digitization*, because it either formally exists *or* it does not. One commonly speaks here of positivity, in this case of the notation. This constitutes an obvious first distinction and consequently also a first possibility of distinction. It separates a merely potential notation from the *actual formal units*. Henceforth, within this formal-logical horizon, further criteria—eo ipso of a formal type—can prevail, which in consequence enables positing formal units in relation, respectively enables to display their differences as formal units. (At a fundamental level, our attempt is to create a realia which continuously assembles itself of them.) The linking of such formal units further exponentiates differences into greater magnitudes. At least theoretically, and practically whenever, in order to formalize, a distinct practice is presupposed which constitutes the formalization: namely, an interactional effort to bear the genesis of notation.⁴

A realia structured in this manner allows for the observers and those interacting with the formal-logical notation to preserve and seal it and furthermore make it publicly verifiable *without the regular correspondence-theoretical dilemma*. It is presupposed that the genesis of notation requires a formal-logical interaction with the realia. Such is the case, if the realia is not merely a documentation referring to historical events but the events itself. The foregoing would only be feasible within the structural framework of *digitization* und *self-verifying history* without external correspondence.⁵

The observation of a realia conditioned in this manner would enable to learn about its contents with a definitive bindingness according to the respective reading or rather interpretation. Only a contentstability with regard to the interpretation of the contents

4 And thus a quasi-“Proof of Genesis” in second order.

5 Compare with this: Hock, Gerald. *Trust and Its Redundancy*, p.8

and not concerning their factuality as historical events per se would remain.

II – The Relatable That Enables Relations

And thus the foundation of bindingness presents itself: namely, *that* events are relatable. The various entities providing bindingness do not emerge from somehow conditioned ‘discourses’—rather, those initiate the possibility of discourses. How many conceptions of a community begin with the formulation of values, rules, conventions that primarily grant their authors an asymmetrical advantage of breaking them under exceptional conditions. So, it is the performativity of that which is not merely upheld ‘normatively’ that enables a community. And then, as a consequence of (mimetic) reproduction, is enabled.

Such ‘reproduction’ of the other and the assimilation of the self as the other of the other structurally renders—exceeding the in-relation-setting—what is possibly linkable. Nothing can be reproduced that was not ‘pro-duced’. Thus, mimesis favors the remaining and excels it to the even-more-remaining. And such is the case while extending an initial grant of trust in advance while being gradually blind. Even though mimesis is well suited for the diffusion of forms, it inhabits also a potential of abuse and ultimately a leveling toward blind copying processes. Without it the humane interaction was impossible, with it the circumvention of human interaction is possible. We will return to this issue later. For now and aside of all the social philosophical remarks on this matter, we are interested in its formal share: namely, how from *nothing something sequences*. Or, how the difference from 0 to 1 is formed and can be repeated (mimetically).

From the positing, from the posited-ness of definitive forms emerges a potential of repetition and thus the contingency of reproduction of something. The identity (Selbigkeit) of the form from repetition to repetition transforms the singular units—a merely as difference framed event—into a sequence which subsequently can become a singular unit as well. The singular unit as a difference to its environment can not emerge as identity (Selbigkeit) but only as self-equality (Selbstgleichheit). That means, the repetition dissolves the status of difference of the first singular unit *but* establishes it with respect to the sequence again. The logical escalation from 0 as a suspension of the category (*not* negation of the unit!) to 1 as a definitively distinguishable unit is uniquely

singular, a positing; or phrased in the terminology of distinction theory: an initial first form which conditions the contingency of subsequently possible forms of the form. Since, if the unit repeats itself from 1 to 2, then their very sequence loses the absolute inequality of their outward. (The outward would then contain the self-equal unit.) The difference from 1 to 0 repeats itself also. That means, does one specify the repetition in regard to what it differentiates itself from (and not in regard to what it is identical with) then it will be identical with the prior unit. The sequence of repetition emanates as a unit and that which was formalized as 2 now composes the 1 in a higher order. That is why the structure of the emerging potentially infinite sequence is 1, 2, 1 and so on.

The sequence is an operative recursion of the unit that flips into a return to unity. If one attempts a succinct question, one could formulate: How does less than not something become a difference? How must the precondition of the form of a realia be designed such that it establishes itself through that which it differentiates itself from? Since, as we have shown, the differences are concrete. Perhaps, the differences are something better suited to be determined, concretized and binding than positively determinable units? Precisely such qualities are significant if one seeks to design a realia incorporated into social arrangements.⁶ A realia of such kind would assemble itself from all that it is not (anymore).

6 Compare with this: "Among the distinctive features of a determination of form that aspires to produce a work of art is the pursuit, from the very outset, of a 'double closure': an external and an internal one. Externally, the work of art must be distinguishable from other things or events; it must not dissolve into the world. Internally, the work achieves closure insofar as every act of form-giving restricts the range of further possibilities that remain available. As a consequence, the internal closure becomes the external closure: it adheres to the frame that is simultaneously produced as an unsurpassable one." (Luhmann, Niklas. *Kunst der Gesellschaft*. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1995, p. 53)

III – Difference Realia

Only within an operationally closed accounting system a self-verifying provenance can be attributed to an object, because the history and the accounting process are identical and there is no room for any correspondence.⁷ The, as an unit observed, object is its provenance. Its relevance to the market does not lay in the ownership, but in the not-anymore-ownership, in its differences. A community which communicates social bindingness based upon the observation of and the interaction with this thing will perceive it as a matter determined by its disparities, a realia made out of differences: as **Difference Realia**.

To conceptualize one of such kind is our goal. The Difference Realia *is* not the through barter acquirable and within trade eligible object—it is only its infrastructural condition. The constitution of worth projected by the (inter)actors does not lay in the ownership of the Difference Realia; but in its Not-Anymore-Ownership *or* In-Ownership-Were-Being, in the suspension of possession, in the passing on. Its assignment—and with that its relevance—is concealed in the continuous relation-making and by that the difference of its past assignment. The Difference Realia is not nothing, but a no-thing. The Difference Realia is the nobject of self-referential provenance.

That is the highest attainable prestige, it is the differentiated entry: pure provenance, the eternal name. There can be no greater gift than that which solely consists in the maintaining disclosure that it took place. The Difference Realia emerges out of the provenance logging of itself and crosses toward the array of its past authors—sequentially from nothing through nothing into nothing—and this makes something. It by itself is no from possession to possession exchanged object. It by itself is no representation of an object and not the represented object. That means, it is no correspondence-theoretical display to account for a reference *and* not accounted for as an unit but merely as form condition with empty places without contents. And the, in this way, provided redundancy of information is information.⁸ Signaling effects communicate via the redundancy of possible communicative contents.⁹ Ensured by the

7 Compare with this: Hock, Gerald. *Epistemic Order*. p. 1

8 Compare with this: Hock, Gerald. *Epistemic Order*. p. 8

9 Compare with this: “The formal principle of functional differentiation signifies nothing other than this far-reaching exclusivity in the fulfilment of functions by specialized systems differentiated precisely for that purpose [...]. Taken to its extreme, it entails the dissolution of all redundancies inherent in multifunctional arrangements.” (Luhmann, Niklas. *Die Wirtschaft der Gesellschaft*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1990, p. 132)

actual application of the Difference Realia as a nexus of giving which illustrates the establishment of its practice, it ex-externalizes itself from its own infrastructure toward its own infrastructure. The Difference Realia is the accounting history of that, *that* it logs its history accountingly: a self-referential provenance. But what, when someone asks what the Difference Realia *is*? And what is it then, what there *is* to attain?

The Difference Realia *is* no something and no not something and not nothing; thereby it permanently becomes the totality of its assessed differences.

The Difference Realia is less than the disappearance of nothing.

IV – Invariant Variance

Why is a formal notation and its genesis needed to display a foundation of social bindingness?

The formal notation inscribes the data digitized as concrete with itself identical values and not gradually variable ones. This amounts to the foundation of formal positivity in general. Such a fixed rigidity allows for the production and reproduction of invariant results and giving up on it would infer arbitrariness into logic, which it excludes in principal. Why then can the rigidity of the form of the Difference Realia be beneficial since it is supposed to respond (spontaneously) to negotiated and negotiating social interactions? After all, our preamble did initially announce to cross a systemic determinism toward a voluntary, non-arbitrary distribution.

„The fundamental idea of logic in the stable arrangement of thinking is this, a thorough security in thinking—this means in the singular operation of thought, in the repetition of operations of thought and in the results of thinking—being assured.“ⁱ The concretion of the form of the Difference Realia renders it in regard to its repetitions, its *re-entries*, in such a manner that after a repetition the newly emerged structural conditions are operationally congruent with the ones prior to the respective repetition. The ‘stable arrangement’ of the Difference Realia, which also is insured by the immutability of the *public ledger* on which it operates, lets it inscribe the genesis of its current state across time while preserve its self-identity.¹⁰ As logic leads to a ‘security in thinking’, the Difference Realia can establish social bindingness because it is the formal fixation point due to its reproducible operativity, which is interpreted according to a given respective

¹⁰ Compare with this the terms “mark” and “calling” in the *Laws Of Form* by George Spencer-Brown.

situation.

That means, referencing a practical example, that a receiver of the distribution can be interpreted as a charity organization, a lucky chosen individual or a capital-loss-generator, tax optimizer or carousel scheme accomplice or whatever else, yet none of this takes place within the Difference Realia's formally encoded provenance nor can it be remembered by it. Undesired distribution pathways will be deselected in future *re-entries* by the coupling of the incentive structures of the giver and the persuadable community. It is important to mention, that the, by the Difference Realia generated, datasets can *not* be changed retrospectively; *but* they remain as interpretable basis for future operations. In this first order of data generation the Difference Realia is constant and unswayable (immutable) in regard to the social readings which are attributed to it retrospectively. For it applies „truth is invariant under change of notation“ⁱⁱ. The variants of reading, that the formal notation and a respective transduction (in)to a system presupposes, do not change the datasets of the Difference Realia even though they are totally variable by themselves. The truth values of the operations of the Difference Realia which are referred to are at all times invariably valid.

One can interrogate this state of affairs by asking how Luhmannian systems theory and von Foerster's Second Order Cybernetics classify the Difference Realia and its notation genesis with regard to the interpretations of linking systems. That may be by asking, what the second order presupposes as first order. The aforementioned theories would be quasi-accounted for by saying: the respective system projects an epistemic order above the Difference Realia which it subsequently can refer to for the sake of its own operations. The interpretations terminate at the borders of the systems and the Difference Realia remains extrasystemically posited as *contingent*. Posed differently, a potential equifinality with regard to the connection operations in second order would persist. Here we reach a speculative limitation.

In contrast to this, one can interrogate, building on Gotthard Günther and his scholar Rudolf Kaehr, if the Difference Realia can be *and* must remain an *object*, an itself identical null point within first order. Because, its recursivity seems to, on the one hand, render operations according to its form conditions rigid and, on the other hand, by that enable the invariance in second order that is fit for the purpose (of social bindingness).

Understood this way, the following also applies in first order to the Difference Realia: “The constitutional inability of an observer, respectively of a constructor to detach from its mono-contextural calculus, respectively dispose the material binding of his position,

prevents the possibility of the factual realization of the calculus. He remains gridded in his genealogy and is forever a simulation of himself. A simulation of a simulation of whatever kind may amplify itself to a self-organizing emergence, yet never escalates out of his categorical determination as virtuality.”ⁱⁱⁱ

The Difference Realia continuously inscribes itself as its self-identity across time which can find relative application as a binding factor; however, it never escalates out of its own limitations and remains the (presupposed) form of its form. Only this way it can be realized, namely as a real virtuality: a kenogrammatical system.

What may suggest a practical deficit given certain circumstances, namely the determinism of and as virtualities and the by that the impossibilization of reified derivatives – and in conjunction the positedness as a merely fictive hocus-pocus is what in our (all too) everyday praxis of living in the time of global networks is *really* appreciated: The continuous suspension into prospection. Upon every horizon follows another horizon—without ultimate destination.

- i P. Egger. *Studien zur Grundlegung der Logik und der logischen Interpretationsmittel*. Hamburg: Meiner Verlag, 1973, p. 10
- ii Goguen, Joseph und R. M. Burstall. „A Study in the Foundations of Programming Methodology: Specifications, Institutions, Charters and Parchments“ In *Category Theory and Computer Programming*. herausgegeben von D. Pitt et al., Berlin: Springer VS, 1986, p. 316
- iii Kaehr, Rudolf. „Disseminatorik: Zur Logik der »Second Order Cybernetics«. Von den Gesetzen der Form zur Logik der Reflexionsform“ In *Kalkül der Form*. herausgegeben von Dirk Baecker, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1993, p. 169